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Abstract 
Prior studies of the effect of group identification on cooperation in social dilemmas have 
advanced two competing accounts of this effect, the goal-transformation hypothesis, 
which holds that identification implies a sense of collective self, which makes personal 
and collective goals interchangeable, and the goal-amplification hypothesis, which states 
that identification induces positive expectations about others’ cooperative behavior.  
These prior studies have, however, neglected to assess the process measures necessary to 
pit the one account against the other. Following prior research, the present study showed 
that the effect of identification was moderated by participants’ social value orientation 
(i.e., individual differences in evaluating the importance of outcomes for self and other) 
in such a way that identification influenced proselfs’ cooperation more than prosocials’ 
cooperation.  This suggests that the consequence of group identification is that collective 
goals become personal goals.  Extending earlier recent research, mediational analyses 
showed that the effect of our identification manipulation was mediated by participants’ 
sense of collective self and not by their expectations. Taken together, these results 
provide strong support in favor of the goal-transformation hypothesis.   
   3
Cooperating if one’s Goals are Collective-Based: 
Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas as a Function of Goal-Transformation  
A social dilemma can be defined as a situation in which personal and collective 
interests are at odds (Dawes, 1980; Komorita & Parks, 1994; Messick & Brewer, 1983).  
In its simplest form, a social dilemma represents an interdependence situation in which 
people have to decide independently to cooperate or not.  Hence, each group member is 
confronted with a choice between two options, to cooperate or to defect.  In these 
interdependence situations, the dominant choice is to act in one’s own best interest, 
because the individual’s incentives for not cooperating are greater than for cooperating, 
regardless of what others do (Dawes, 1980).  However, if all group members opt for this 
dominant choice, all will end up worse than if all make the choice to cooperate.   
Rational choice theories (e.g., Luce & Raiffa, 1957) assume that people will 
pursue their own self-interest, and, therefore, cooperation in groups seems difficult to 
achieve.  However, according to Edney (1980), “The truer perspective is that human 
beings probably have greater capacities for both socially constructive [i.e., collective 
interested] and destructive behaviors [i.e., based in self-interest] around resources” (p. 
148).  In other words, under specific situations, people may indeed be inclined to exhibit 
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.  One typical solution to this conflict between 
personal and collective interest, and one, which truly incorporates a social focus, is 
increasing the extent to which decision-makers identify with the collective. 
The major purpose of the present research is to examine the psychological 
mechanisms underlying this social identification effect in social dilemmas by focusing on 
the role of two psychological variables that may account for this effect: Expectations   4
about other group members’ cooperation, and the sense of collective self inherent in 
social identification. Following recent research (e.g., De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999), this 
was investigated by examining the interaction of social identification with individuals’ 
social value orientation. In an important extension of this earlier research, we also 
assessed the mediating roles of group members’ expectations of others’ cooperation and 
of the sense of collective self that is inherent in identification.  
Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas 
A number of studies and reviews have concluded that the extent to which 
individual decision-makers define themselves in terms of their group membership may 
function as a reference point for their decision behavior (Brewer & Schneider, 1990; 
Kramer & Brewer, 1986).   When affiliation with the group or collective is reinforced, 
“the group is the basis of cooperation” (Turner, 1987; p. 34).  Empirical studies have 
indeed shown that when people exhibit strong group identification, relative to weak 
group identification, people invest more in public good dilemmas and exercise greater 
restraint in resource dilemmas (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; 
De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Kramer & Goldman, 1995, Wit 
& Wilke, 1992).  Yet, up until now, it still is not clear how exactly social identification 
effects produce this collectively desirable behavioral outcome. 
  We argue that, because of the specific nature of the social dilemma conflict in 
which one’s individual interest is plotted against the collective interest, two processes 
may be particularly important.  First, in social dilemmas decision-makers may fear to be 
exploited by the others and to end up as the “sucker” (Kerr, 1983).  Therefore, to increase 
cooperation, this element of risk should be reduced; a situation that can be achieved by   5
increasing people’s expectations that the others will cooperate (De Cremer, Snyder, & 
2001; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).  As positive expectations increase, confidence in the 
goodwill of others and fear of exploitation is reduced, lowering the threshold to engage in 
cooperation (De Cremer et al., 2001; Van Leeuwen & van Knippenberg, 2002). Research 
on intergroup relations suggests that an enhanced sense of group identification may 
produce more positive expectations toward other ingroup members, relative to outgroup 
members (i.e., ingroup favoritism; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For example, Brewer (1979) 
argued that ingroup members are judged as more trustworthy and honest than outgroup 
members, particularly when group identity is reinforced (Brewer, 1979); a process also 
referred to as group-based trust (Brewer, 1981). A first explanation of the social 
identification effect in social dilemmas thus is that higher identification is associated with 
more positive expectations about the cooperation of others, and that these expectations 
invite own cooperation.  
A second explanation lies in the merging of self and group that is inherent in 
social identification.  Social identification reflects a sense of oneness with the group, 
where the self is defined in terms of membership in, and characteristics of the group (e.g., 
Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Smith & Henry, 1996; Turner, 1987).  The more the self is 
defined in collective terms (i.e., the collective self; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Turner, 
1987), the more collective goals will be experienced as the own goals, and collective 
interests as self-interests (i.e., collective self-interests rather than personal self-interests; 
De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; van Knippenberg, 2000; van Knippenberg & Ellemers, in 
press; cf. Brewer, 1991). Accordingly, the higher group identification, the less likely it 
will be that motives like greed and free riding (i.e., which are rooted in the personal self-  6
interest) will dominate decisions (cf. Rapoport, 1967), and, therefore, the higher the level 
of cooperation. The second explanation of the social identification effect in social 
dilemmas thus is that high compared with low identification is associated with a different 
definition of self and as a consequence with a different definition of self-interest. 
To summarize, then, the literatures on social dilemmas and social identification 
suggest two processes that may account for the effect of social identification on 
cooperation in social dilemmas: The effect of identification may be caused by its 
influence on expectations about others’ cooperation or it may be caused by the sense of 
collective self (which will make personal and collective goals interchangeable) that is 
inherent in identification.  Both processes should be able to reduce the influence of two 
dominating motives in social dilemma situations, fear and greed.  Recent research 
attempted to answer the question of which of the two processes primarily underlies the 
cooperation-enhancing effect in social dilemmas by examining the interaction between 
social identification and group members’ social value orientation (SVO; De Cremer & 
Van Vugt, 1999; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002; Kramer & Goldman, 1995).  Social value 
orientations are individual differences in how people evaluate outcomes for themselves 
and others in interdependent situations (McClintock, 1972; Messick & McClintock, 
1968).  Broadly speaking, people can be classified as prosocial individuals (i.e., aimed at 
maximizing joint outcomes and equality in outcomes), competitors (i.e., aimed at 
maximizing the difference between outcomes for self and other) or individualists (i.e., 
aimed at maximizing own outcome, regardless of other’s outcome).  The latter two are 
usually referred to as proselfs (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Previous research on this 
individual difference variable has convincingly demonstrated that prosocials exhibit more   7
cooperative behavior than proselfs and express a greater concern with the group as a 
whole (e.g., De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995).   
The interactive effects of identification and SVO is especially diagnostic in the 
study of the effects of social identification on cooperation in social dilemma, because 
social value orientations are related to expectations of others’ cooperation as well as to 
the weight attached to the own self-interest. First, if identification would enhance positive 
expectations, then particularly prosocials would be influenced in their behavior.  This 
prediction was derived from two social dilemma findings.  According to Pruitt and 
Kimmel’s goal-expectation theory (1977), two conditions have to be met to elicit 
cooperation, that is, (a) one should have a pro-social or cooperative goal, and (b) one 
should expect others to cooperate.  Second, prosocials, relative to proselfs, believe that 
others cooperate more, but they also expect some variability in levels of cooperation 
across persons (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; see also Van Lange, 1999).  Positive 
expectations that others will cooperate should thus reduce this variability in expectations 
among prosocials, but not among proselfs.  Thus, if a strong sense of group identification 
reinforces positive expectations then particularly those with an initial prosocial goal (i.e., 
a sense of collective self), should be influenced most in their contribution behavior, what 
we refer to as the goal-amplification hypothesis (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999). 
  This hypothesis can be contrasted with the argument of De Cremer and colleagues 
(De Cremer & Van Dijk, in press; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; see also van 
Knippenberg, 2000) that if group identification affects people’s sense of collective self, 
and therefore the definition of self-interest (i.e., shifting from personal to collective self-
interest), particularly the decisions of proselfs should be influenced.  From the social   8
value orientation literature follows that proselfs as compared with prosocials assign more 
weight to outcomes for self than to outcomes for others (e.g. McClintock, 1972).  As a 
consequence of this dispositional difference in the weight assigned to the self-interest, 
proselfs’ behavior should be more contingent on factors that influence the definition of 
the self-interest, such as identification is proposed to do. Brewer (1979) argued that a 
strong sense of identification promotes group-oriented actions, because "the reduced 
differentiation between one’s own and others’ outcomes associated with ingroup formation 
provides one mechanism for increasing the weight given to collective outcomes in 
individual decision-making” (p. 322).  Elaborating these insights, it can be predicted that 
group identification, due to an enhancement of people’s sense of collective self, should 
influence contribution behavior more among proselfs than among prosocials; we call this 
the goal-transformation hypothesis (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999).   
Studies employing this identification by social value orientation approach have 
yielded first evidence in favor of the goal-transformation hypothesis.  For example, De 
Cremer and Van Vugt (1999) demonstrated in a series of public good dilemma studies 
that proselfs were most strongly influenced by manipulations of group identification, an 
effect that was replicated by De Cremer and Van Dijk (2002), who showed that this effect 
is particularly strong when people lack information about prior failure or success (see 
also Kramer & Goldman, 1995, for some partial evidence). However, although these 
reported interactions between identification and SVO provide us with a strong (theory-
derived) indication in favor of the goal-transformation hypothesis, no research to date has 
also examined the process variables that are assumed to underlie this interaction effect.  
This is problematic, because finding behavioral effects consistent with the proposed   9
hypothesis does not necessarily mean that the associated processes do occur as well.  
Therefore, for a proper test of the merits of the goal-amplification and goal-
transformation hypotheses, it is necessary that the proposed mediating processes of the 
social identification effect are examined in addition to behavioral measures.   
Such was the aim of the present study.  In the present study, we extended earlier 
research on the interaction of social identification and social value orientation in social 
dilemmas with two key process measures: A measure of expectations of others’ 
cooperation and a measure of identification.  The former may be affected by 
manipulations of identification, the latter, of course, should be affected by manipulations 
of identification.  Of critical importance, the goal-amplification hypothesis requires that 
the former mediates the effect of manipulations of identification, whereas the goal-
transformation hypothesis requires that the latter mediates the effect of manipulations of 
identification on cooperation.  Based on De Cremer and Van Vugt’s (1999) findings in 
support of the goal-transformation hypothesis (see also De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; 
Kramer & Goldman, 1995; van Knippenberg, 2000), we predicted that our identification 
measure, which reflects a sense of collective self, rather than positive expectations, 
mediates the effect of identification that in earlier studies was found to be moderated by 
SVO.  Finding both evidence for the interactive effect between SVO and identification, 
and the mediating effect of a sense of collective self reflected in identification would 
provide unambiguous evidence in favor of the goal-transformation hypothesis.   
Furthermore, and contrary to the assumptions of the goal-amplification 
hypothesis, we expected that expectations, rather than a sense of collective self, mediate 
the main effect of SVO (i.e., more cooperation by prosocials than by proselfs).  This   10
prediction is derived from research that has demonstrated that prosocials, relative to 
proselfs, exhibit the same level of cooperation as they expect from others (see Van Lange 
& Kuhlman, 1994).  Because prosocials are generally more cooperative than proselfs 
(e.g. De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001), their expectations about other’s behavior are 
assumed to be more positive. 
Finally, another aspect that distinguishes the present research from the earlier 
mentioned studies is that we used another type of identification manipulation. In these 
earlier studies, identification was manipulated by introducing a social comparison 
between one’s own group and another group to enhance feelings of group identification 
(i.e., social competition; Turner, 1975).  One aspect of this social comparison 
manipulation is that the notion of competition becomes very pervasive, and consequently 
people may cooperate more with their own group due to motives related to winning this 
competition, rather than experiencing a strong sense of collective self.  Therefore, to 
further validate and generalize the discussed identification effect, we used an 
identification manipulation that varied self-ingroup similarity, which is assumed to be a 
key determinant of identification (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1987) rather than 
intergroup comparison/competition.  
Method 
Participants and Design  
One hundred and eight undergraduate students from several different majors from 
the University of Amsterdam (40 men, 68 women; mean age 20.59) were randomly 
assigned to either the high or the low identification condition, and classified as either 
proself of prosocial on the basis of an SVO measure (see below). This yielded a 2 (SVO:   11
prosocials vs. proselfs) x 2 (Identification: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial 
design, with cell sizes varying from 20 to 26 participants.   
Procedure 
Upon arrival in the laboratory, each participant was seated in a separate cubicle 
that contained a computer, a table, and a chair.  All instructions were given via the 
computer.  Before explaining the purpose of the study, each participant was allocated an 
experimental letter.  Participants (five per session) believed that they would get a unique 
letter (A, B, C, D, or E).  In reality, each participant got the letter D. 
  Assessment of social value orientation. As a first task, they completed a 
computerized version of the nine-item Decomposed Games measure to assess their social 
value orientation (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  The 
Decomposed Games instrument has excellent psychometric qualities.  It is internally 
consistent (e.g. Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; Parks, 1994), reliable over substantial time 
periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 1992), and is not related to measures of social 
desirability or indices of mood (e.g., Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986; Platow, 1992; Van 
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991).  Moreover, there 
is evidence for its ecological validity in various domains (e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; 
Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998; Van Vugt et al., 1995).   
  The task consists of nine items, each containing three alternative outcome 
distributions with points for oneself and an (anonymous) other.  Each outcome distribution 
represents a particular orientation.  An example is the choice between alternative A:  500 
points for self and 500 points for other, B:  560 points for self and 300 for other; and C:  500 
points for self and 100 for other.  Option A represents the cooperative or prosocial   12
orientation, because it provides an equal distribution of outcomes (i.e., 500 for self and 
other).  Option B represents the individualistic option because own outcomes are maximized 
(560 versus choice A and C, i.e., both 500) irrelative of other’s outcomes.  Finally, option C 
represents the competitive orientation because this distribution maximizes the difference 
between own outcome and other's outcomes (Choice C:  500 - 100 = 400, versus A:  500 - 
500 = 0, and B:  560 - 300 = 260).   
 Participants  are  classified  as prosocial, individualistic or competitive when at least 
six choices (out of nine) are consistent with one of the three orientations (e.g., McClintock 
& Allison, 1989; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  In the present study we only used the 
comparison between prosocials and individualists, because the group of competitors was 
considered too small for subsequent analyses.
1 Therefore, out of a total number of 108 
individuals, 46 (43 %) were identified as prosocials, and 42 (39 %) as individualists.  
Introduction to the public good dilemma. After completing the decomposed 
games, participants were introduced to a decision-making study in small groups 
consisting of five persons each.  They were told that they would be participating in a 
collective-decision making task in which they would be asked several times to contribute 
toward the establishment of a public good.  To avoid endplay, no specific number of 
contribution sessions was mentioned (Murnighan & Roth, 1983).  More specifically, each 
participant was given an endowment of 100 chips, worth each 5 euro cents, at the 
beginning of each contribution session, and they were free to choose any amount they 
wanted to contribute (ranging from 0 to 100 chips).  It was explained that the total 
amount contributed by the group would be multiplied by two and then divided equally 
among all group members.  The number of chips that one did not contribute to the group   13
would accrue totally to oneself.  All of this was illustrated with various examples of 
possible outcome distributions.   
Manipulation of group identification.  To manipulate group identification, we 
gave participants bogus feedback about the composition of their group. In the high 
identification condition, participants learned that all but one member of their group had 
the same study major as the participant him or herself. In the low identification condition, 
participants learned that all other members of their group had the same study major, 
which was different from participants own major. In this way, the group was equally 
homogeneous in terms of study major (four members with the same major, one with a 
different major) across conditions, while the similarity between the participant and the 
group varied across conditions. 
Then, the dependent variables of this study were solicited.  First, participants’ 
level of group identification was assessed by five items reflecting the degree to which 
one has a sense of collective self (Van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2000). 
Items include “I see myself as a typical member of this group”, and “I feel a tie with this 
group” (answers on 7-point scales with endpoints labeled absolutely not [1] and very 
much so [7]). Thereafter, participants were asked how much they were willing to 
contribute (ranging from 0 to 100 points).  Finally, participants’ expectations about 
other’s cooperative intentions were measured by asking them how much they expected 
the others to contribute. 
Results 
Identification 
Testifying to the success of the identification manipulation, a 2 x 2 ANOVA on the   14
identification measure revealed a main effect of Identification, F(1, 84) = 10.32, p < .005, 
showing that sense of a collective self was higher (M = 3.96) in the high identification 
condition than in the low identification condition (M = 3.10). Neither the SVO main 
effect, F(1, 84) = 0.49, ns., nor the interaction, F(1, 84) = 0.04, ns., affected 
identification. 
Contributions  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on contributions revealed, first of all, a main effect of SVO, F(1, 
84) = 3.86, p = .05. Overall, prosocials contributed more (M = 61.21) than proselfs (M = 
47.24).  The main effect of identification was not significant, F(1, 84) = 0.31, ns, but the 
predicted Identification by SVO interaction was, F(1, 84) = 4.49, p < .05 (see Table 1).  
Tests of simple main effects showed that when identification was low, prosocials 
contributed more than proselfs, F(1, 84) = 9.13, p < .003, but when identification was 
high, proselfs contributed as much as prosocials, F(1, 84) = 0.01, ns. In a similar vein, 
test of the simple main effects of Identification showed that this was marginally 
significant for proselfs, F(1, 84) = 3.44, p < .07, but nonsignificant for prosocials, F(1, 
84) = 1.27, ns.  
Expected contributions  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the contribution expected from the other members of the 
group, revealed only a significant main effect of SVO, F(1, 84) = 4.75, p < .05: 
Prosocials expected higher contributions (M = 51.91) than proselfs (M = 39.41). Neither 
the Identification main effect, F(1, 84) < 1, ns., nor the interaction, F(1, 84) < 1, ns., were 
significant. 
Mediational analysis    15
Because Identification did not affect expectations of others’ cooperation, we can 
rule out the goal-amplification account of the identification effect. However, it remains 
important to establish whether the effect of our identification manipulation is mediated by 
our the sense of collective self reflected in our measure of identification, as the goal-
transformation hypothesis predicts--if only to rule out other, alternative explanations (i.e., 
self-group similarity might affect other, unmeasured, variables as well).  Put differently, 
we know that our manipulation affected the sense of collective self reflected in our 
measure of identification, but is this also the reason why the Identification manipulation 
and SVO interacted in affecting contributions?  To address this issue, we conducted a 
mediational analysis.  
In the “conventional” mediational analysis, the aim is to test whether a main or 
interaction effect obtained is mediated by the main effect of the mediator variable. 
Adding the mediator variable to the ANOVA design or the regression equation and 
showing that the effect of the mediator is significant whereas the to-be-mediated effect no 
longer is, is then the final step in the mediation analysis (after showing that the to-be-
mediated effect affects the mediator and the outcome variable; Baron & Kenny, 1986). In 
the present case, however, we do not propose that measured identification mediates the 
Identification x SVO interaction (which could be tested in a convential mediational 
analysis), but rather that measured identification mediates the effect of manipulated 
identification in the Identification x SVO interaction. That is, we need to show that the 
moderating effect of manipulated identification on SVO is explained by measured 
identification. This requires a slightly more complicated mediational analysis that is 
explained by Hull, Tedlie, and Lehn (1992).  Applying their technique, we need to show   16
that the interaction of measured identification (i.e., participants’ identification scores) and 
SVO mediates the interaction of manipulated identification and SVO. To test this 
prediction, we entered the measure of identification to an ANCOVA design as a 
continuous variable and tested both the measured identification main effect and the SVO 
by measured identification interaction.  In addition, in this ANCOVA, also the main 
effects of our Identification manipulation and SVO and the Identification manipulation 
by SVO interaction were tested.  
In line with our predictions, the measured identification by SVO interaction was 
significant, F(1, 82) = 6.42, p < .05, whereas the (manipulated) Identification by SVO 
interaction was no longer significant, F(1, 82) = 1.52, p > .20.  Importantly, the main 
effect of SVO remained significant, F(1, 82) = 9.06, p < .005.  Interestingly, whereas the 
main effect of our identification manipulation was not significant in the original analysis 
nor in the present analysis, F(1, 82) = 0.18, ns., the main effect of measured identification 
was, F(1, 82) = 7.92, p < .01.  Inspection of the regression weights for the effects of 
measured identification showed that higher identification was associated with higher 
contributions (β = .29 for the identification main effect) and that this relationship was 
weaker for prosocials than for proselfs (β = -.26 for the interaction).  Tests of the simple 
main effects of measured identification for each level of SVO further confirmed our 
predictions (i.e., supporting the goal-transformation hypothesis).  The simple effect of 
measured identification was significant and positive for proselfs, β = .38, F(1, 82) = 
13.63, p < .0001, but not significant for prosocials, β = .02, F(1, 82) = 0.04, ns.  We may 
thus conclude that a sense of collective self mediated the effect of our Identification 
manipulation in the Identification by SVO interaction, but not the main effect of SVO.   17
The second issue we raised was the role of expectations of others’ contributions.  
We proposed that these expectations would mediate the main effect of SVO, but because 
we did not find any evidence in support of the goal-amplification hypothesis (i.e., 
expectations as an explanation for the identification effect in social dilemmas) we did not 
predict it to mediate the Identification by SVO interaction.  To examine whether this was 
true, we tested this prediction in a second mediational analysis in which we again 
followed the analysis of Hull et al. (1992).  That is, in addition to the SVO main effect 
and the manipulated Identification x SVO interaction, we added both the expected 
contributions main effect and the manipulated Identification by expected contributions 
interaction to our ANCOVA design.  Results revealed that the main effect of expected 
contributions was significant, β = .80, F(1, 82) = 150.25, p < .0001, whereas the SVO 
main effect was no longer significant, F(1, 82) = 0.17, ns.  Further, if the goal-
amplification hypothesis is not valid, the manipulated Identification x SVO interaction 
should remain significant.  In line with this, ANCOVA indeed showed that the expected 
contributions by Identification interaction was not significant, F(1, 82) = 1.34, p > .25, 
and that, most importantly, the Identification by SVO interaction remained significant, 
F(1, 82) = 6.21, p < .025.  We may therefore conclude that expected contributions 
mediated the main effect of SVO, but not the Identification by SVO interaction.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
  The fact that a social identification influences level of cooperation suggests a 
socialized conception of decision-making (Kramer & Goldman, 1995), but how actually 
does it work?  Following the present findings, a goal-transformation explanation seems to 
account best for these social identification effects. Indeed, in line with previous studies,   18
we found a significant interaction between identification and SVO, showing that proselfs 
were influenced more by the identification manipulation than prosocials. Furthermore, 
and more importantly, our mediational analyses demonstrated that a sense of collective 
self, and not participants’ expectations, mediated the identification effect that was 
moderated by SVO.  In the following paragraphs, we will discuss these findings in 
greater detail. 
  The present findings provide strong support for our prediction that social 
identification effects in social dilemmas can be explained by people’s tendency to include 
the group and its goals into the self (i.e., goal-transformation hypothesis). Taken together, 
the fact that the identification effect was only found among proselfs (who assign more 
weight to outcomes for the self relative to those for the group) and that the effect of the 
identification manipulation was mediated by a measure of identification operationalized 
as a sense of collective self can be seen as compelling evidence that the primary 
mechanism responsible for the social identification effect is the transformation of 
personal goals into collective-based goals (i.e., a sense of collective self).  Using the 
terminology of interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), enhancing one’s sense 
of collective self thus seems to transform an existing situation with a given payoff to self 
and others (i.e., objective matrix) into another situation, which directs decisions on the 
basis of more broader and collective goals (i.e., effective matrix).  As such, our findings 
add evidence to a growing number of studies advocating the goal-transformation 
hypothesis as a primary explanation of the social identification effect (De Cremer & Van 
Vugt, 1999; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; van Knippenberg, 2000).    19
  These results align well with Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 
1987).  Following SCT, level of identification may depend on the degree of self-group 
similarity or perceptions of homogeneity within the group perceived by the group 
members (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1987).  When perceived similarity 
between self and the group is low, people’s sense of self is defined at the level of the 
individual, whereas they will define themselves at the collective level when self-group 
similarity is high.  More specifically, if this similarity is high, people will use their group 
membership and sense of a collective self to define themselves and their concurrent goals 
(Turner, 1982).  In accord with SCT, our manipulation of group identification influenced 
the self-perception of proselfs in such a way as to cause a shift from the personal level 
towards the higher, more inclusive group level (“me” becomes “we”-identity).   As a 
consequence, our interpretation (in favor of the goal-transformation hypothesis) as such 
implies that self-interest can be defined at many different levels, from narrow personal 
interest to the interest of the collective (i.e., different levels of abstraction, see Turner et al., 
1987).  If a collective self is reinforced, the self-interest at the personal level is transformed 
to self-interest at the collective level, and cooperation becomes the "rational" choice (Turner 
et al., 1987).   
 Contrary  to  the  goal-amplification hypothesis, prosocials remained largely 
insensitive to the group identification manipulations.  Why may this be?  One explanation is 
that prosocials have more positive expectations about others than proselfs do, and they are 
therefore less sensitive to information, which further enhances their trust in others’ 
cooperation.  Contrary to this intuitively compelling assumption, however, previous 
studies have mainly failed in finding a relationship between SVO and positive   20
expectations (Parks, 1994; Van Lange et al., 1998; for an exception see Kuhlman, Camac, 
& Cunha, 1986).  For example, it has been found that prosocials and proselfs do not 
differ significantly in dispositions of general trust (Parks, 1994).   Indeed, these studies 
suggest that rather than expecting reciprocity, it seems that prosocials engage in cooperation 
because they believe it is the morally right thing to do (Beggan, Messick & Allison, 1988;  
Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991).  In this sense, prosocials can be 
regarded as "genuine" cooperators who cooperate for a particular collective cause, 
regardless of whether other individuals do the same (Van Lange et al., 1998).  Despite these 
claims, our mediational findings do show that expectations mediated the main effect of 
SVO.  This observation shows some similarities to previous research by Van Lange and 
Kuhlman (1994), who assumed and partly demonstrated that prosocials, relative to 
proselfs, exhibit the same level of cooperation as they expect from others.  As such, 
expectations or, in other words trust in others’ cooperative intentions, do seem to be 
related to the actions of prosocials in decision-making situations.  Thus, the frequently 
observed effect of SVO in social dilemmas may be related to another important 
psychological factor in social dilemmas, that is, expectations.   
Before closing, some limitations and strengths need to be outlined. An important 
potential limitation is that we measured participants’ expectations after they had made 
their decision.  As a consequence, expectations may have been influenced by the main 
outcome variable cooperation (i.e., reverse causal effects, Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 
1998) in a way that responding to the expectations item involved some type of 
“dissonance reduction” to justify their prior decision.  However, if this would be true than 
we should have found that expectations mediated all effects (including the interaction),   21
but this was not the case. In fact, only the main effect of SVO was mediated by 
expectations.  An important strength is that we were able to demonstrate strong and 
compelling evidence, by means of a moderator and mediating approach, in favor of the 
goal-transformation hypothesis. Moreover, the fact that we also used a different 
manipulation of group identification than prior studies supporting this hypothesis, 
validates and generalizes the observed identification effect in social dilemmas and allows 
us to be even more confident about the prediction that social identification in social 
dilemmas enhances one’s sense of collective self. 
Taken together, the present findings are in line with a theoretical account 
advocating that the primary reason why social identification influences levels of 
cooperation in social dilemmas is because decision-makers’ include the group and its 
goals into the self (i.e., collective self) and are therefore motivated to pursue the 
collective welfare.  As such, these findings illustrate the importance of motivational 
processes in decision-making as a function of the extent to which one feels included in 
the collective.  If this sense of inclusion is salient then goals are triggered that serve to 
collective.  Thus, it can be concluded that cooperation seems to emerge, at least partly, 
from collective-based goals. 
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Footnote 
 
1 We are aware that some previous research combined individualists and competitors 
into one group of proselfs. However, because a social dilemma constitutes a clear conflict 
between one’s own personal interest and the collective interest, we decided to compare 
cooperators (i.e., prosocials) with individualists (i.e., proselfs) in our analyses, because the 
motives of these two types of individuals represent best this conflict between interests and as 
such allows for an unambiguous interpretation of our findings.   
   30
Table 1.  
Group Identification, Contributions, and Expected Contributions as a Function of Social 
Value Orientation and Identification 
   Identification  Dependent 
Variables 
SVO High  Low 
Prosocial  4.02 (1.23)     3.22 (1.25)     Group 
Identification 
Proself  3.89 (1.01)     2.98 (1.41) 
Prosocial  55.65 (30.19)     66.77 (31.40)     Contributions 
Proself  56.57 (36.90)     37.73 (34.26) 
Prosocial 48.25 (20.54) 55.58 (25.97)  Expected 
Contributions 
Proself 41.00  (29.67)  37.82 (29.67) 
Note. Entries are means on 7-point scales and contributions that could range from 0 to 
100 points, with higher values indicating higher identification, contributions and 
expectations; entries within parentheses are standard deviations.   31
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